U.S. v. Williams

Adam Williams was convicted in Indiana for distribution of narcotics and possession of a firearm as a felon in 2008.  He chose to appeal his conviction to the 7th Circuit on several points, one of which was the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1).  The section in question bars convicted felons from owning firearms.

The Court’s opinion is here [pdf].  Williams based his appeal in part on the Skoien decision, which has since been remanded.  The Court considered the applicability of that case in the current proceedings and found it wanting:

And although we recognize that § 922(g)(1) may be subject to an overbreadth challenge at some point because of its disqualification of all felons, including those who are non-violent, that is not the case for Williams. Even if the government may face a difficult burden of proving § 922(g)(1)’s “strong showing” in future cases, it certainly satisfies its burden in this case, where Williams challenges § 922(g)(1) as it was applied to him. Williams, as a violent felon, is not the ideal candidate to challenge the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1). [p. 16]

Skoien considered the question of a misdemeanant, not a felon.  Furthermore, there is a big difference between a felony conviction for writing a few bad checks and one for violence.  Under the Skoien doctrine of “intermediate” scrutiny (and perhaps even strict scrutiny), the court finds that a ban on firearms possession by violent felons passes muster. Part of me agrees.

According to the case, Williams had previously beaten a robbery victim so badly that the victim required 65 stitches [p. 15]. It doesn’t look like he’s mended his ways in the meantime.  It’s not unreasonable to say that he really doesn’t need to be owning a gun.  The government’s claim that § 922(g)(1) serves a purpose in disarming a man like Mr. Williams pretty much constitutes a “strong showing.”

Lest we worry that the court is handing ammunition to the other side, they acknowledge the fact that a more suitable challenge may grow legs in the future:

But the government does not get a free pass simply because Congress has established a “categorical ban”; it still must prove that the ban is constitutional, a mandate that flows from Heller itself. Heller referred to felon disarmament bans only as “presumptively lawful,” which, by implication, means that there must exist the possibility that the ban could be unconstitutional in the face of an as-applied challenge. Therefore, putting the government through its paces in proving the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) is only proper. [pp. 13-14]

This case was a stinker, but let’s hope we see a more suitable challenge at some point.